NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 15

Number 1

Article 3

1994

Jus AD BELLUM IN THE SHADOW OF THE 20TH CENTURY
Christopher R. Rossi

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rossi, Christopher R. (1994) "Jus AD BELLUM IN THE SHADOW OF THE 20TH CENTURY," NYLS Journal of
International and Comparative Law: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol15/iss1/
3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Jus AD BELLUM IN THE SHADOW
OF THE

20TH CENTURY

ChristopherR. Rossi*
I. INTRODUCTION

Few people who consider the prospect of establishing a better and new
world order on the eve of the third millennium cite the teachings of the
remarkably important, but now relatively obscure, Venezuelan Arbitrations
of 1903.1 Given the subject matter of these arbitrations, which dealt with
major issues of international law and state, it is unfortunate that they now
seem to hold but a modicum of interest.
In one sense, the obscurity of these arbitrations is understandable, given
the more distracting, dangerous, and capriciously indeterminate post-World
War II order. Vexing world issues, from nuclear annihilation to the crushing
problems of debt and development, tend to focus political and public attention
on topical matters, and not on the machinations of an international legal
process now almost one century old. In another sense, however, the
arbitrations' relegation to historical obscurity is surprising. They directly and
successfully dealt with an exigent matter of international debt, a topic that in
important respects is more pressing today than it was at the turn of the
century.

As an instructive analogue and for their contributions to the

jurisprudence of international claims, the Venezuelan Arbitrations merit more
attention than they usually receive.
The arbitrations present a compelling case for revisitation. They
represent a historical benchmark in the centuries-old development of the law
of war. Specifically, they mark a qualitative reassessment of the very concept
of war and the resurgence of the idea that a sovereign must first establish
cause before resorting to it. The establishment of cause, specifically just
cause, had been an idea in decline for nearly three centuries. 2 This
* Assistant Professor of International Politics and Foreign Policy, The American
University School of International Service. Ph.D. and M.A., Johns Hopkins; LL.M.,
London; J.D., Iowa; B.A., Washington University. The author thanks Nicholas 0. Onuf and
Edgardo Mondolfi for helpful commentaries and Gina Beck, Hilde Haaland, and Jamie Frueh
for able research assistance.
1. See JACKSON H. RALsTON & W.T. SHERMAN DOYLE, VENEzUELAN ARBrrRATIONs OF
1903, S.Doc. No. 316, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1904).
2. See generally IAN BROWNLiE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
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reassessment has produced a discernable, albeit subtle, shift in the legal
doctrine of jus ad bellum, which is the law regulating the right of states to
resort to war.3 This shift, which is the fundamental argument of this Article,
is that states increasingly behave as if recourse to force for the recovery of
outstanding pecuniary claims is illegal; such recourse represents an unjust
cause.
This shift has left an important imprint on the international relations of
this century. But this imprint has been occluded by the dramatic conceptual

enlargement of jus ad bellum that followed the creation of the League of
Nations and attended the establishment of its successor, the United Nations.
This second shift made war illegal," and later outlawed threats and uses of
force.'
In assessing the modern development ofjus ad bellum, yet another major
shift is taking place in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union.' The
nature of this shift may be in dispute, but post-Cold War interpretations tend
to favor opportunistic or paradigmatic reformulations of the jus ad bellum
regime. 7 In examining this shift, these appraisals fail to note this century's
first and most enduring modification to the jus ad bellum regime. In addition
to this oversight, these enthusiastic appraisals of change fail to recognize that
the attributes of the state-centric system, and not the fortuitous withering
away of the Soviet Union, are at the heart of the problem regarding the
creation of an efficacious twenty-first century jus ad bellum regime.
But academics are now intent on establishing jus ad bellum's proper
place in the new world order-and the doctrinal disposition against
STATES 10-14 (1963); JOSEF L. KuNz, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 622-23 (1968);
GERHARD

VON

GLAHN,

LAW

AMONG

NATIONS:

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1976).
3. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
1982) [hereinafter LAWS oF WAR]; see also J. H. W. VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10-11, 215 (1978).

4. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, art. I, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1929) ("The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their
relations with one another.') [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
6. See infra notes 65-124.

7. See id.
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retrospective analysis is clear. But this disposition is unfortunate because
consideration, or reconsideration, of the enduring importance of this earlier
shift in the jus ad bellum regime (a shift that antedates both the demise and
the birth of the Soviet Union) imparts an understanding of jus ad bellum's
future applicability and significance, particularly in the areas of both
international criminal law and torts. Additionally, looking backward imparts
an understanding of the potentially over-inclusive and not entirely intelligible
extension of the notion ofjus ad bellum that attended the outlawry of war and
the later prohibition against threats and uses of force. But until humanity
reconciles the legal conditions that outlawry imposes with what is only, at
best, irregularly enforced, there will be no complete and enduring jus ad
bellum regime.
One aspect of this Article addresses the claim that states no longer use
force to recover debt. In making this claim, this Article highlights the
Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903,' which laid the foundation for history's first
conventional expression of a restriction on the right of states to resort to
force.' This Article also argues that the twentieth century has infused jus ad
bellum with a broader and over-inclusive meaning. This infusion has had two
discernable and negative effects on the concept.
First, jus ad bellum's connection to its rich jurisprudential past,
particularly its relationship tojus in bello (the law regulating war's conduct),
has been almost completely severed."0 This severance promotes the general
misconception that jus ad bellum's recovery from sixteenth, seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth century doctrinal assault occurred only with the
advent of the period between World War I and World War II, a period
marked by the revival of natural law thinking in the form of Wilsonianism.11
As a basis of Western legal theory, natural law dates to the writings of the
ancient Greeks. 2 Its line of development, although not always controlling,
has been continuous since their time. 3 Natural law expresses the belief in a
set of immutable and rationally deducible norms that transcends cultural
boundaries and legal systems and gives rise to a moral basis of obligation. "
8. See generally RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1.
9. See infra, note 31.
10. See Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the 1990-199i Gulf Conflict, 18(3) INT'L
SECURITY 134, 136 (1993/1994) (noting overlap, however in matters such as proportionality,
neutrality, and economic rights of occupying powers).
11. See KuNz, supra note 2, at 623; ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONcISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 251, 276-77 (1950).
12. See WOLFGANG FRmDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 98 (5th ed. 1967).
13. Id. at 96.
14. CHRISTOPHER R. RossI, EQUTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL REALIST
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In the twentieth century, one of the greatest advocates of a natural law

approach to international affairs was President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson
called for the creation of a global concert of nations, which came into being
as the League of Nations." Predicated on the idea of universal collective
security, the League attempted to promote democracy, liberal notions of
equality and techniques of peaceful settlement. This grandiose vision, which
16
represented the ethos of Wilson, has come to be known as Wilsonianism.
This Article argues that the reconciliation of these twin concepts occurred
earlier, only to be shattered by Wilsonianism. This reconciliation was
proximately related to an important sense of attitudinal change that attended
the Venezuelan Arbitrations. This Article further argues that this attitudinal
change was not sui generis, but rather the result of a prodromal period
traceable to the mid-nineteenth century. This result is somewhat surprising
because this period marked the primacy of positivism" and the law of war's
close identification with jus in bello."
Second, this infusion has made the doctrine ofjus ad bellum particularly
and unduly susceptible to the realist critique. Realists 9 criticize the modern

jus ad bellwn regime because the regime cannot constrain many belligerent
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECSIONMAKONG

12 (1993).

15. President Wilson's Fourteen Points, in H1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
IDEA: DocuMENTs AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE MARBURG 839-840 (Point
Fourteen) (John H. Latan6 ed., 1932).
16. See generally Robert W. Tucker, The Triumph of Wilsonianism?, 10 WORLD POL'Y
J. 83-99 (1993/94); see also infra text accompanying notes 163 and 164.
17. As a jurisprudential approach, positivism contends that laws are commands of
individuals and that they do not express any necessary connection to morality. Hence, the
basis of legal obligation is the consent to be bound to any particular rule. Friedmann , supra
note 12, at 256-57.
18. But see NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 276 (arguing that a deeper scrutiny of positivism
led to a certain dissatisfaction with the doctrine).
19. Realists are people who explain international relations in terms of power and power
politics. They tend to view human nature as selfish and this view is extrapolated to the level
of interstate behavior, where states are motivated by rational self-interest. Realists also stress
the non-hierarchical structure of international society, which lacks a supra-national authority

capable of enforcing commands. Consequently, realists view the international system as
essentially anarchic. Leading 20th century realist texts include: GEORO SCHWARZENBERGER,
POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1951); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966); RAYMOND ARON, PEACE
AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (R. Howard & A. B. Fox trans.,

1966); EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1974); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W.
THOMPSON, POLrrICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (6th ed.
1985).
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acts between and among states." In this sense, realists criticize the system
for promising far more than it can deliver. While realists may agree with
others that aggression should be outlawed, they apologetically point out that
no effective international legal mechanism ensures that aggression is
outlawed. Realists claim that they take the world as it is (lex lata), not as it
should be (de legeferenda). But what they do not realize is that sometimes
even they cannot handle the logical consequences of their position.
II. Jus AD BELLUM's VENEZUELAN PROLEGOMENA
A. The Venezuelan Arbitration Commissions
Unfortunately eclipsed by the power and primacy of the realist
perspective has been the view of the Venezuelan Arbitrations and their more
modest, yet enduring, contribution to the modern notion of jus ad belwn.
Their contribution was not merely doctrinal, nor can their effect be
discounted as merely dreamy and aspirational. The arbitrations facilitated the
peaceful settlement of a dispute that put Venezuela and at least three
European powers-England, Germany, and Italy-at the brink of war. 2 The
subject matter of the arbitrations was recognized at that time as potentially
"the most prolific source of conflicts" among states.2
Beginning in the summer of 1903, ten international claims commissions
met in Caracas to arbitrate outstanding disputes concerning pecuniary losses
suffered in Venezuela by major European powers,' the United States, and

20. See generally Robert W. Tucker, The Principle of Effectiveness in International Law,
in LAw AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (G.A. Lipsky ed. 1953); GEORG
Sc rA=EmERGER, THE INDUcrmV- APPROACH To ImTEPRNATIoNAL LAw (1962).

21. See generally Friedmann, supra note 12.
22. See the correspondence of R. Lopez Baralt, Ministry of Foreign Relations of the
United States of Venezuela (August 12, 1902) reprinted in RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note
1, at 955 (noting a memorandum presented by the Emperor of Germany to the United States
Secretary of State enumerating "grounds held by the Imperial Government for a contemplated
coercive or comminatory action against the Republic of Venezuela."); see also the
correspondence and cablegrams relating to the Venezuelan Protocols, telegram from Mr.
Bowen, Legation of the United States to Venezuela to Mr. Hay, United States State
Department (December 9, 1902) (informing that combined British and German warships had
captured all Venezuelan war vessels in La Guaira harbor), reprinted in id. at 1029.
23. General Porter, Address to the subcommission of Commission I of the Hague Peace
Conference (July 16, 1907), reprinted in WILLIAm 1. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONE'RECES
AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 352-53 (1908) [hereinafter, THE Two
HAGUE CONFERENCES].

24. The European claimants were: Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, France, the
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Mexico. The work product of the commissions, which addressed over one
thousand outstanding claims, provides important insight into the law of state
responsibility,' particularly the still contentious law governing remuneration
for foreign wealth deprivations.' Additionally, some of the arbitral cases are
now cited routinely for standard, if not dispositive, treatments of particular
international legal doctrines, including, inter alia, the doctrines of exhaustion
of local remedies, ultra vires, and denial of justice." The terms of the
protocol governing the arbitrations are also of historical importance for their
rare and sometimes disparaged reference to the application of absolute or pure
equity, which was the standard of review governing the arbitrations."0
While dicta from the arbitrations have contributed to the development of
international jurisprudence, their substantive value is outweighed by the less
recognized qualitative contribution. As this century ends, it is worthwhile to
recall, if not recognize, that the first conventional restriction placed on the
right of states to resort to war occurred in the twentieth century. This
restriction represents a profound benchmark in the history of international
relations and international law. This benchmark is contained in Hague

Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Norway.
25. See the Dix Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1, at
7; Underhill Cases (U.S.-Venez. Commission), id. at 45; Irene Roberts Case (U.S.-Venez.
Commission), id. at 142; De Lemos Case (Gr. Brit.-Venez. Commission), id. at 302; J.N.

Henriquez Case (Neth.-Venez. Commission), id. at 896.
26. See the Dix Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1, at
7; American Electric and Manufacturing Co. Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), id. at 35;
Monnot Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), id. at 170; Petrocelli Case (Italy-Venez.

Commission), id. at 762; Martini Case (Italy-Venez. Commission), id. at 819.
27. See the Woodruff Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission.), RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note

1, at 151; Rudloff Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), id. at 182; Davy Case (Gr. Brit.-Venez.
Commission.), id. at 410; Martini Case (Italy-Venez. Commission.), id. at 819.
28. See Orinoco Steamship (U.S. v. Venez.), 5 AM. J. INT'L L, 35 (1911).
29. See the Woodruff Case (U.S.-Venez. Commission), RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note

1, at 151; De Caro Case (Italy-Venez. Commission), id. at 810; Bovallins and Hedlund Cases
(Swed.-Venez. Commission), id. at 952.

30. Protocol of February 17, 1903, art. 1, reprinted in RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note
1, at 2 (establishing formally the American-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission,
instructing "Jtihe commissioners, or, in case of their disagreement, the umpire, shalt decide
all claims upon a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections of a technical nature,
or of the provisions of local legislation.").
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Convention 11,31 the so-called Porter Convention.
traces directly to the Venezuelan Arbitrations."

2

But as an idea, this inroad

B. The Blockade
A brief review of the historical events surrounding the conventional
expression of this restriction will impart a better understanding of its
significance. Technically, the principals already may have been in a state of
war. In early December 1902, Great Britain instituted a naval blockade-a
per se belligerent act according to classical doctrine-against five
Venezuelan ports and mouths of the Orinoco River." This blockade was
followed by bombardments of the cities of La Guaira, Puerto Cabello, and
Maracaibo, 36 and the seizure of the Venezuelan fleet." Later that month, and
joined by Germany and Italy, these powers formalized their position with a
declaration of blockade.38 Despite an initial German attempt to mask its
belligerent status by euphemistically calling its actions a peace blockade, an
attempt to which even the British objected, 39 the hemispheric implications of
this tripartite declaration were ominous. Future students of this artful dodge
31. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery
of Contract Debts, art. I, reprintedin THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899
AND 1907, 489 (James B. Scott ed., 1917) [hereinafter REPORTS].
32. Named afer a proposal submitted at the second plenary session, 19 June 1907, and at
the first meeting of Commission I, 22 June 1907, of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference by
United States delegate, General Horace Porter, reprintedin THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES,
supra note 23, at 350-70.
33. See RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1.
34. ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTrrALIY AT SEA 283-95 (1955);
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 492 (1974).

35. The five ports were: La Guaira, Carenero, Guanta, Cumana, and Carupano. See
British Official Notice of Blockade, December 20, 1902, reprinted in ALBERT E. HOGAN,
See also HOWARD C. HILL, RoOSEVELT AND THE
PACIFIC BLOCKADE 183 (1908).
CARIBBEAN 117-118 (1927).
36. Luis M. Drago, State Loans in their Relation to InternationalPolicy, 1 AM. I. INT'L
L. 692 (1907).
37. Venezuelan Preferential Case, reprintedin THE LAw OF NATIONS 953, 954 (Herbert
W. Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1952).
38. HILL, supra note 35, at 118.
39. The British Prime Minister rejected the idea of a pacific blockade. Id. at 118-19. But
c'f. CHARLES 0.

FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 438-39 (2d ed. rev. 1934) (citing state

practice of pacific blockade during the second quarter of the 19th century, including the
Venezuelan case, acknowledging, however, that the blockade was "essentially an incident of
war.*).
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would settle on another equally ambiguous euphemism for blockade, the
quarantine. 40
Nomenclature aside, the threat of European military intervention into the
domestic affairs of a South American country presented a major challenge to
the United States. Although not enamored with the regime of Venezuela's
President, General Cipriano Castro,'41 U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt

insisted that any kind of collective European punishment not take the form of
43
In accordance with the Monroe Doctrine,
military occupation.' 2
supplemented by the use of its good offices,' and possibly underscored by
a veiled threat of military action in defense of Venezuela, 4 the United States
brokered an agreement to arbitrate as the quid pro quo for lifting the
blockade. Following the creation of the necessary protocols and terms of
reference,' which expanded the arbitrations to include other countries'
grievances, the various disputes were submitted to claims commissions.
Further complicating the arbitral agreement was a demand for preferential

40. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE
OF LAW 14-15 n.33 (1978); see generallyROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR
OP THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1968).
41. See HILL, supra note 35, at 208, 212. For a specific accounting of grievances against
Venezuela, see HOGAN, supra note 35.

42. See Correspondence of President Theodore Roosevelt to William R. Thayer (Aug. 21,
1916) (stating "[there was) no objection whatever to Castro's being punished, as long as the
punishment did not take the form of seizure of territory and its more or less permanent
occupation by some Old-World Power.'), in 8 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1102
(Elting E.Morison ed., 1954) [hereinafter LETTERS].
43. Message of the President of the United States at the Commencement of the First
Session of the Eighteenth Congress (December 2, 1823), in AMEmcAN STATE PAPERS,
FOREIGN RELATIONS V (Doc. 360) 245-50 (1858).
44. See correspondence of Dr. R. Lopez Baralt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United
States of Venezuela to Herbert W. Bowen, Legation of the United States to Caracas,
December 9, 1902, reprinted in RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1, at 1030.
45. According to a personal correspondence of President Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick
Scott Oliver, dated July 22, 1915: "... I told the German Ambassador... that unless I got
an offer to arbitrate from his Government within ten days, Admiral Dewey and his fleet would
sail to the Venezuelan coast, supervise the German squadron, and forbid their occupying one
foot of territory." LETTERS, supra note 42, at 956. But cf. HILL, supra note 35, at 126-28
(casting some doubt on "the evidence in support of Roosevelt's narrative" given the
recollections of Admiral Dewey and others. Nevertheless the conclusion beyond argument
was "that [Roosevelt] would have offered naval and military resistance to a seizure... if
attempted by either Germany or Great Britain." Id. at 136-137). See also LESTER D.
LANGLEY,

AMERICA

AND

THE AMERICAS:

THE UNITED STATES

HEmiSPHERE (1989).

46. See generally RALSTON &

DOYLE,

supra note 1.

IN THE WESTERN
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treatment by the blockading powers; they insisted that their awards be
honored in full before claims were paid out to pacific participants. In a
criticized award, the Permanent Court of Arbitration-twice misnamed as it
was neither permanent nor a court-held that the blockading powers were
entitled to preferential treatment because Venezuela "recognized 'in principle
the justice of [their] claims'" while no such recognition could be discerned
from the protocols signed with the non-blockading powers.! Interestingly,
the tribunal's rationale did not hinge on the general principle of law
prohibiting a party from benefiting from its own illegal action (ex injuria jus
non oritur), nor legally should it have. The blockading powers were not
violating international law.
The events that precipitated this turn of the century crisis related to the
recovery of debts owed to foreign creditors, a familiar and contentious subject
in the history of modem international law and one of particular sensitivity to
countries of South and Central America." Payments on these debts had been
interrupted because of a prolonged period of revolutionary activity in
Venezuela.49 Not surprisingly, these civil insurrections resulted in damage to
property owned by foreign nationals living or doing business in Venezuela.
Additional claims arose from Venezuela's suspension or default on external

debt payments that had been incurred through the prosecution of previous

47. Venezuelan Preferential Claims (Germany, Gr. Brit., Italy and Veiez.), 1 HArUE CT.

REP. (Scott) 55, 59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1904) (1916). For a critical assessment, see JOHN H.
LATAN,

THE UNrrED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 256 (1920).

48. In addition to the 1902 blockade against Venezuela, instances of armed intervention
for 1he specific purpose of reclaiming conuzactaal debis include- The 1%3% and 1%61 Firenth
intervention in Mexico; Germany's indemnity campaign against Haiti in 1897, as well as
various interventions by the United States in a number of Central American Republics,
including Santo Domingo in 1904 and Haiti in 1915. See generally FRANK G. DAWSON &
IVAN L. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS
7-26 (1971); EDwiN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECT'ION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
821 (1915); DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE, A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACy 13 (1955). Other accounts of 19th century blockades

against Latin American and other countries are contained in HOGAN, supra note 27. Doctrinal
justification for the U.S. activism was contained in certain corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine.
In March 1901, the U.S. Congress approved the Platt Amendment, which in effect asserted
Cuba as a protectorate of the United States and, inter alia, prohibited Cuba from "assum[ing]
or contract[ing] any public debt* the interest on which could not be repaid. See MICHAEL J.
It cited "chronic
KRYZANEK, U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 37 (2d ed. 1990).
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized
society" as a basis for the U.S. "exercise of an international police power.* Id. at 42.
49. See infra, note 51.

[Vol. 15
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wars, the construction of its rail system, and other projects involving public
works. s°
Although Venezuela had experienced periods of political upheaval since
achieving formal independence from Colombia in 1830, particularly during
the bloody Federal War (1859-1863), the situation deteriorated in March of
1898 with the first nationalist revolution of General Jose Manuel Hernandez
and exploded in the following three years."' During these three years, no less
than eight insurgencies and revolts arose, ending with an interval of peace
following the Revolution of Liberation of 1901-1903.12 This period of acute
upheaval precipitated the threatening and coordinated actions of Great Britain,
Germany, and Italy.
C. InternationalArbitrations
The idea of resorting to international arbitration as a substitute for war
was not new at the turn of the century. But it was not the preferred course
of dealing among states. With the failure of other available options, most
notably diplomacy, states still retained and asserted the unfettered legal right
to resort to war as an instrument of national policy."3
While examples of belligerent state behavior abounded, history recorded
at this time important examples of restraint. The Jay Treaty Arbitrations
(1794), s' the Alabama Arbitration (1871-2),-" the Behring Sea Fisheries7
dispute (1893),' and the British Guiana Boundary Arbitration (1897)5
50. See Hill, supra note 35, at 106; see also Drago, supra note 36, at 692.
51. RALSTON & DOYLE, supra note 1, at 1060-66 (describing the rebellion of General
Ramon Guerra in the State of Guarico in 1899; the 1899 Revolution of the Restoration; the
Second Nationalist Revolution in 1899 and 1900; the Puerto Cabello insurrection of General
Antonio Paredes in 1899; the revolt of General Celestino Peraza in the State of Guarico in

1900; the revolt of General Pedro Julian Acosta in the States of Cumana and Margarita in
1900; the 1901 San Cristobal invasion of General Carlos Rangel Garbiras; the Lara
insurrection of General Rafael Montilla in 1901; and the revolutionary activity of General
Juan Pietri in 1901-1902).
52. Id. at 1064-66.
53.

FREDERICK

S. DUNN,

THE

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
VON GLAHN, supra note 2.

54. 1

TREATIES, CoNVENTIONS,

PROTECTION OF NATIONALS,

A

STUDY

IN

THE

57 (1932). See generally Shea, supra note 48; and

INTERNATIONAL ACrs, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PowERS,

1776-1909, 590-610

(William M. Malloy ed., 1968) [hereinafter Malloyl.
55. CHARLES C. HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES, 1592-1593 (2nd ed. 1945). See generally 1-4 PAPERS RELATING TO
THE TREATY OF WAmNaroN (1872).
56. Malloy, supra note 54, at 746-65.
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brought to successful and peaceful conclusions disputes that easily could have
resulted in wars.
In line with the Venezuelan Arbitrations, these earlier tribunals supported
the proposition that forbearance from war through recourse to arbitration
could be a viable option in any state's foreign policy. But the significance of
such forbearance, given the widest spectrum of legal possibilities available to
states at that time, did not constitute a burgeoning opiniojuris;ss forbearance
merely expressed the unexceptional and unencumbered sovereign right of a
state to seek a mode of settlement appropriate to its individual assessment of
circumstance. Importantly, no qualitative adjustment to the notion of war
attached to the actions of these individual arbitrations.
But a qualitative adjustment did attach to the Venezuelan Arbitrations,
even though this adjustment did not manifest itself immediately. Specifically
motivated by the Venezuelan blockade,"9 and fortified by an earlier and much
broader critique of the law of state responsibility by the famous jurist, Carlos
Calvo, ° Argentina's Foreign Minister Luis Drago solicited United States
support for a Pan-American corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that would
have barred the forcible collection of externally held public debt.6 ' Motivated
by his country's own parochial interests, the new U.S. Secretary of State
Elihu Root proffered revisions to the so-called Drago Doctrine at the third
Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1906.12 What survived was
recommended for consideration by the conferees at the Second Hague Peace

57. HYDE, supra note 55, at 291-94.
58. Opinio juris is the subjective requirement for the establishment of customary
international law. According to the International Court of Justice, "[tlhe states concerned
must.., feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough." North Sea Continental Shelf

Cases, 1969 I.CJ. 3, 44.
59. See SHIEA, supra note 48, at 15 n.12 (1955).
60. See generally LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL THEORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE (4th ed. rev.
1887/88) (articulating on the basis of sovereign equality and national independence the
doctrine that no governmental responsibility for indemnity attaches to losses sustained by
foreigners during periods of domestic turmoil or civil insurrection); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (6th ed.
1976); REPORTS, supra note 31.

61. See Instructions of the Minister of Foreign Relations to the Minister to the United
States (Dec. 29, 1902), reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-5 (1903);
see also Drago, supra note 36, at 692-93.
62. See LANGLEY, supra note 45, at 109.
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Thereafter, the proposal took the form of Hague Convention

The conventional restraint placed on states' previously unqualified right
of war was modest in scope and procedural in character. Ultimately, states
retained the right to resort to war if the debtor-state failed to reply or submit
to a request for arbitration, or perform on settlement. 0 But qualifying the
absolute right to resort to war, even with a modest barrier in only one
specific field nevertheless constituted a qualitative, albeit under-appreciated,
reassessment of the modern law of jus ad bellum.
III. A TWENTITm CENTRY Sm-r iN TnE
NOTION OF JUS AD BELLUM
A. The U.N. Jus ad Bellum Regime
There is no doubt that a shift in the notion of jus ad bellum has taken
place in the twentieth century. Scholarly and diplomatic interpretations of
this shift tend, however, to focus on problems regarding the relevance of the
modern jus ad bellum regime. Discussion regarding this regime centers on
the United Nations Charter, principally, article 2(4), containing the
proscription against threats or use of force, article 51, preserving the inherent
right of individual or collective self defense, the evolving practice of peacekeeping, and the peace-seeking and enforcement measures specified in
Chapters VI and VII 6 ' Despite voluminous literature, or perhaps because of
it, and activated by millenarian impulses and conceptions of a new world
order, much of the discussion about the Charter's jus ad belium regime is
either hortatory, misdirected, or ahead of itself. Certainly, the discussion
does not take into consideration the teachings of the Venezuelan Arbitrations
and the resulting Hague Convention II.
Already, the Secretary General of the United Nations has drafted, at the
behest of the Security Council, a blueprint for preventive diplomacy, a
preemptive initiative to ease international tension and resolve underlying
causes of conflict using extant and suggested U.N. instrumentalities.' 7 This
63. See REPORTS, supra note 31, at 186-88.
64. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery
of Contract Debts, reprinted in id. at 48. For other abbreviated historical accounts of events
leading to Hague Convention U, see Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited
(Second Phase), (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 465-69 (sep. op. Judge Ammoun).
65. REPORTS, supra note 31, at 489.

66. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 106, 107.
67. See An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping,
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initiative, obviously influenced by former U.N. Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjold's earlier exposition of the concept," is in line with other
recent administrative proposals to streamline the organization and make it
more solvent and responsive to international vicissitudes. 9 Although, on its
face, this blueprint is more serious and less surprising than previous Soviet
proposals to invigorate the moribund U.N. Military Staff Committee, 7" and
more credible than President Reagan's bemusing suggestion to develop the
Star Wars' peace shield in order to share it with enemies and allies alike, 71
it is not clear that an attitudinal shift commensurate with the promise of
preventive diplomacy has taken place.' Certainly the bulk of the Secretary
General's recommendations is familiar. His calls for the development of
enhanced fact-finding and confidence building measures' and unconditional
acceptance by states of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice are not new.74 But, they do not reflect poorly on the endeavors of

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, (1992). See also,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, 37 Orbis 323 (1993).
68. INis L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 313 (4th ed. rev. 1971).
69. See FORD FOUNDATION, FINANCING AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS, A REPORT OF
TIE INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON U.N. FINANCING (1993); Dick Thornburgh, To
Make the U.N. Work, Wash. Post, March 25 1993, at A25 (discussing TTHE REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1 March 1993); K.P. SAKSEN, REFORMING
THE UNITED NATIONS,

THE CHALLENGE OF RELEVANCE (1993); BRIAN URQUHART &

ERSKINE CHILDERS, TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS (1992); BRIAN
ToMoRRow'S
URQUHART & ERSKINE CHILDERS, A WORLD IN NEED OF LEADERSHIP:
UNITED NATIONS (1990).
70. Thomas G. Weiss & Meryl A. Kessler, Moscow's U.N. Policy, 79 FOREIGN POL'Y
94, 99 (1990).
71. President Reagan, debate with Walter F. Mondale on Foreign Affairs and Defense,
October 21, 1984; interview with British Broadcasting System, October 29, 1985; interview
with Soviet journalists, October 31, 1985, reprintedin STAR WARS QuOTES 48 (Arms Control
Association ed., 1986).
72. See Albert Legault, United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, THE STATE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: 1992, 1, 10 (1992) (noting the incongruence between discussions of
a new international order and the "begging in every direction" by U.N. officials for finances).
73. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, August 1,
1975, reprintedin 14 LL.M. 1292 (1975) (also known as the Helsinki Accords).
74. Burns H. Weston, Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Nuclear Weapons-Free
World, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1077, 1090 (1990) (suggesting enhanced United Nations factfinding); David A. Koplow, Ams Control Inspection: ConstitutionalRestrictions on Treaty
Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229, 262 (1988) (discussing how
NATO states and Warsaw Pact nations developed "confidence-building measures"); Leo
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the Secretary General. They merely highlight the state-centric constraints in
which the Secretary General operates. They also reflect what is most
certainly true about the modem notion of jus ad bellwn. There is nothing
materially wrong with the regime that cannot be remedied by the attitudinal
adjustment of its members.
B. A Sense of Attitudinal Change?

A sense of attitudinal change now saturates the academic literature," and
a most enthusiastic appraisal of this attitudinal shift has been offered by

Professor Thomas Franck. "A rare opportunity," based on the "[systemic]
transformation of the global ethos" has yielded a "nearly global move towards
democracy .... "76 This move has the potential of "reinventing" the United
Nations and establishing a "normative, institutionalized right of self
determination."I At its best, this "trend in the direction of a global
conscience [is] capable of interfering with injustice" not merely with regard
to gross domestic violations of human rights, but in "those instances where
governments deny their own populations the right to participate

Gross, Compulsory JurisdictionUnder the Optional ause: History and Practice 19 in THE

Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987)
(tracing back to the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907 attempts to establish a
permanent tribunal endowed with compulsory jurisdiction).
75. See Richard B. Bilder, International Law in the "New World Order : Some
Preliminary Reflections, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1992) (noting the "cottage
industry" developing over interpretations of the new world order); James A.R. Nafziger, Se/fINTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori

Determination and Humanitanan Intervention in a Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L

L. & PoL'Y 9, 27 (1991) ("Although the Gulf War was unique in many respects, it
nevertheless portends an accelerated emergence of a community of power, in the Wilsonian
sense, to replace the bi-polar balance-of-power system"); Ved P. Nanda, 7he Use of Force
in the Post-Cold War Era: An Introduction, 20 DEwy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1991)
(arguing that the post-cold war era "presents a unique opportunity for revisiting the existing
norms on the use of force in the international arena.").
76. Thomas M. Franck, InterventionAgainst IllegitimateRegimes, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 158, 160-161 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer

eds., 1991) [hereinafter Intervention].
77. Id. at 168; Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 88-90 (1992)

[Diemocracy, thus is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that
increasingly will be promoted and protected by coullective international processes.
Both textually and in practice, the international system is moving toward a clearly
designated democratic entitlement, with national governance validated by
international standards and systematic monitoring of compliance.
Id. at91.
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democratically in the process of governance." 78 And "[a] t a minimum, the
illegitimacy of any government... innon-compliance with the normative
standards would stand starkly exposed before its own people and other
nations. That psychological effect should not be underestimated ...."79
However, the kind of measures proposed by Professor Franck to "bring
the U.N. Charter's proclaimed norm of self-determination into the twentyfirst century" 0 seem underwhelming. They do not match his effusive
assessment of opportunity,"1 now that "[p]eople have been liberated from the
"'I In essence, he suggests
,
obsessive constraints of the Cold War .
creating institutionalized means of monitoring compliance to free and open
elections 3-including, as characterized by another scholar, the "ingenious"
countermeasure of shaming recalcitrant governments"-and establishing
penalties for transgressions."5 Ingenious or not, Professor Franck recognizes
that the monitoring idea is certainly not new." And if it is indeed "an idea
whose time has come,""7 it appears, given his own assessment of the stark
realities of the state-centric world, that the broader idea of "free,
multilaterally-supervised elections needs time to become firmly established."88
For this reason, Professor Franck finds "no need to speculate" about the jus
ad bellum implications of the emerging right of self determination.89
Consideration of a collective United Nations sponsored military intervention
against transgressors of the democratic process is premature given the time
needed to cultivate and firmly establish such an idea."

78. Intervention, supra note 76, at 163-64.
79. Id. at 169.
80. Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
81. "History affords few moments so ripe as the present ones with opportunity for
" Id. at 160. Two specific historical
institutional and philosophical reevaluation ....
'moments for seizing' mentioned by Professor Franck were the Congress of Vienna in 1815
and the birth of American constitutionalism in 1787. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 164.
84. Ann-Marie Burley, Commentary on Intervention Against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW
AND FORCE IN THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ORDER 177, 178 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David
I. Scheffer eds., 1991).
85. Intervention, supra note 76, at 164.
86. Id. at 167.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 170.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Even if Professor Franck's idea amounts to a discernable shift in the
quality or character of the Charter, he expressly recognizes that the shift can
take place entirely within the context of the Charter; no amendment would be
necessary to implement such a system. 91 But arguments now support the
proposition that a different kind of shift has taken place in the Charter's jus
ad belwn configuration.
The argument unfolds with a Kuhnian sense of significance.' Professors
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck, the authors of the argument, assert that a
post-Charter, self-help paradigm has emerged," one that has taken
international law 'beyond the Charter paradigm. ' Attending this shift is a
new value hierarchy that repudiates the Charter's assumption that peace is
more important than justice."s But seeking justice beyond the Charter is
curious because the authors adopt Professor Franck's "rejectionist"
interpretation of the efficacy of the Charter's jus ad bellum scheme.'
Professor Franck articulated this position in a noted 1970 article provocatively
titled Who Killed Article 2(4)? 7 Professor Franck argued that the Charter's
proscription against threats and uses of force was "predicated on a false
assumption," namely the continued cooperation of the five permanent
members of the Security Council.' He further contended that the relevant
rules "were imperfect and, to some extent, already obsolescent by the time
the Charter came into operation," only to be denuded of proscriptive content
by the subsequent practice of states." Professor Franck's underlying point
was that the post-Charter practice of states was essentially indistinguishable

91. Id. at 168.
92. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE

OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLuTIONS 10 (2d ed.,
enlarged 1970). Thomas Kuhn begins a discussion about the role of normal science, which
is research predicated in scientific achievement acknowledged in the scientific community as

the foundation for further practice. Closely related to normal science are paradigms, or
models of scientific practice that broadly commit members of the community to the same rules
and standards. Id. at 10-11. Kuhn's study of the power and nature of paradigms has been
profoundly influential in and out of the field of the history of science.
93. See ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 4-5, 178 (1993).

94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 179.
96. Id. at 184-85; Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norns
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970) [hereinafter Who Killed
Article 2(4)?1.
97. Who Killed Article 2(4)?, supra note 96.
98. Id. at 810.
99. Id.
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from their previous practice, and this previous practice was dominated by
calculations of self interest and "old-fashioned, power-oriented realpolitik." 1 "
Adoption of this negative approach begs an important question
sidestepped by Professor Franck,"'1 but not the architects of this new
paradigmatic edifice-what is beyond the Charter if there is not much there
to begin with? The appropriate answer, to which Professors Arend and Beck
paradoxically revert but do not recognize fully, is the classical and modem
pre-Charter history regarding the use of force. What the authors fail to
recognize is that their emerging paradigm beyond the Charter system is more
properly reflective of the jurisprudential power of the past. Lost in their
analysis, however, is the actual enlargement of jus ad bellum that has taken
place through the avenue of international claims settlement. Professors Arend
and Beck argue that the validity of the Charter system has been attacked by
problems such as Charter interpretation, a "change in the nature of
international conflict," the perceived illegitimacy of institutions geared toward
peaceful change and conflict settlement, enforcement problems, and a
growing concern for justice over peace."
The authors assert that few
scholars recognize that these events constitute a shift of paradigmatic
magnitude. 1 3 They are correct. Most scholars recognize that the issues
relevant to this negative approach antedate the Charter system. The issues
are endemic to the positivist critique of international law's efficacy and have
not changed much since the nineteenth century.l" Ironically, the authors then
employ a positivist approach-abjuring ethical and moral adulterations of

100. Id. at 836.
101. Professor Franck concluded in 1970 that the death of the U.N. Charter's normative
approach to jus ad bellum placed individuals in a sort of security dilemma. Any nation's
pursuit of its national interest would come at the expense of individuals' tranquility.
Accordingly, he reported
There are, increasingly, signs that the citizen will not indefinitely pay the price
demanded by the conventional national interest, and [the] rejection of the
traditional [power approach]... may turn into a universal, skeptical reassessment
. .. [from which] could emerge a new set of criteria .... Consciously or not,
the popular redefinition of national interest is already under way.
Id. at 836.
102. See AREND & BECK, supra note 93, at 4-5.
103. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
104. This approach, which is based on a criminal law analogy, narrowly defines law as
a type of command that is capable of being enforced by a sovereign authority. See generally
JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PosrrivE LAW (1875);

W. JETHRO BROWN, THE AUSTINImAN THEORY OF LAw (1963); JEREmY BErnHAM, THE
LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED (1945); JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE OR THE
THEORY OF THE LAw (1902).
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law'05-to determine "one possible description" of those "authoritative and
controlling" rules that have arisen since the inception of the Charter to "fill
the gap caused by the death of Article 2(4)."101
But there is nothing new about the mortar used to fill these gaps. The
lawfulness of recourse to force in the new post-Charter paradigm is asserted
in cases involving self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, and reprisals. 1 07 But
this point surely does not go beyond the Charter paradigm, as the authors
well recognize. These practices date to antiquity. The customary right of
self-defense is of course textually affirmed in the Charter. 15 The doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense, if not kneaded into the "if an armed attack occurs"
language of Article 51,11 entered the legal lexicon with Daniel Webster's
formula, which dates to the 1837 Caroline incident."' And the law of

105. AREND & BECK,supra note 93, at 188.
106. Id. at 185. The authors find value in using the concepts of 'authority" and "control"
to describe the essence of "rules" of international law. The meanings they impart to the
concepts are essentially positivist in nature and the authors specifically distance their usages
from the more familiar construction imparted by the New Haven school. Id.
107. Id. at 185-86.
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 51
109. Id. A strictly textual reading of article 51 of the Charter does not admit the
possibility of anticipatory or preemptive acts of self-defense. Article 51 holds that "[n]othing
*. . shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ifan arned attack
occurs ....
" (emphasis added). The textual construction of Article 51 has been attacked as

hyper-restrictive and unworkable given our age of nuclear and chemical weaponry and rapid
delivery systems. The textual construction implies an absurdity. A targeted state first would

have to risk strategic enervation or potential annihilation before invoking its legal and inherent
right of self-defense. But, in either case, such a right would be seriously compromised or
illusory. Academic perorations on the meaning of the article abound, but many authorities
have attempted to read the charter provision in light of the customary law of anticipatory selfdefense, as articulated in the CarolineIncident, infra note 110. In this sense, these authorities
have attempted to "knead" the rigid and textual language of the Charter to allow for a more
elastic interpretation, one that would countenance the customary right of anticipatory selfdefense. See generally VON GLAHN, supra note 2, at 131-34.
110. The incident involved a cross-border raid by British subjects against an American ship
moored on the U.S. side of the Niagara River. The ship had been used to ferry supplies into
Canada in support of insurrectionists. Acting on orders of the British commander at
Chippewa, British soldiers crossed the river, boarded the ship, killed the cabin boy, "little
Billy" and another unfortunate, and then sent the Caroline ablaze over Niagara Falls. In
correspondence to British counterparts in April 1841 and July 1842, U.S. Secretary of State

Daniel Webster formulated a staudard for anticipatory self defense that established the modern
customary law. Webster's 'formula required a showing of "necessity of self defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. [The act must

not be] unreasonable or excessive.. •[and] must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it." R.Y. Jennings, 7he Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. I.INT'L L. 82 (1938);
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reprisal has an identifiable history almost as traceable as the doctrine of
proportionality."'
It is appropriate to recall the scholastics' 112 doctrinal exposition of
proportionality, which was an important refinement of Augustine's fifth
century notion of just war."' Furthermore, it is well recognized that the
failure of jus ad bellum necessitates the springing into action of the law
antedating the Charter paradigm. " 4 This body of law is jus in bello, the
classically-evolved laws regulating the conduct of war.
The post-Charter paradigm shift finds additional and ostensible support
in the admittedly more controversial claim that "there would seem to be a
right for states to use force to promote self-determination however they define

William W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS VII 77 (1962).

111. Reprisals are forceful acts of self-help done in retaliation for an unredressed and illicit
act of an offending state. It is the unredressed nature of the offense that provides legal
justification for the reprisal, which itself otherwise would be illegal. Although force is
employed, reprisals are considered acts short of war. The leading case on point, the so-called
Nauliaa arbitral award of 1928, (officially referred to as Damages to Portuguese Colonies in
South Africa (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1011 (1928)), discussed the relationship
between the reprisals and the offense. In canvassing relevant historical authority, the tribunal
found that most writers considered a "certain proportion between offense and reprisal a
necessary condition of the legitimacy of the latter Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted) ("La plupart
voient, dans une certaine proportion entre offense et repr6 saille, une condition n cessaire de
la l6gitimite de la seconde."). The tribunal tethered this condition of proportionality to the
"rules of humanity and good faith" that apply in interstate relations. Id. In dictum, the
tribunal somewhat elliptically concluded "[elven if one admits that international law does not
require that reprisals be measured approximately by the offense, one must certainly consider
as excessive, and consequently illicit, reprisals out of all proportion to the act which has
motivated them." Id. at 1029 ("M~me si 'on admettait que le droit des gens i'exige pas que
la reprdsaille se mesure approximativement k l'offense, on devrait certainement considrer,
comme excessives et partant illicites, des repr6sailles hors de toute proportion avec l'acte qui
les a motiv6es.").
112. The Scholastics or Schoolmen, represented the dominant philosophy of the Middle
Ages. They were Christian prelates who attempted to rationalize Church dogma and
ecclesiastical doctrine through a new method of inquiry and disquisition done in the setting
of universities. See generally W.S. Sahakian, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 93-118 (1968).
113. This point is recognized by the authors. See AREND & BECK, supra note 93, at 1314 (discussing Augustine's arguments regarding just war). See also J. EPSTEIN, THE
CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 92-93 (1935) (summarizing Augustine's just
war doctrine and including, inter alia, the dictate that "only so much violence. . . as is
necessary") (emphasis in original); Judith D. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in
InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 394-395 (1993).
114. SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 60, at 158-159; Roberts, supra note 10,
at 136.
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it.""' But tethering the doctrine of self-determination to the subjective
assessments of states is an illusory connection.
Such a connection
deconstructs the doctrine in much the same way that a self-judging reservation
clause mangles the idea of compulsory jurisdiction. This correction turns the
doctrine into a hollow shell. And if the illogic of this assertive right is
deconstructive, so too is their usage of the notion of self-determination.
Their usage denies the doctrine's ratione materiae, which by definition
involves the "right of peoples to choose their own legal and political
institutions.""' They, however, erroneously associate the concept with the
right of states.
Basing this determination on the subjective assessments of individual
states also leads to expansive, destructive, but nevertheless lawful
interpretations of state behavior. And although the authors regrettably profess
an understanding of the law as it is (lex lata) as opposed to the law as it
should be (de legeferenda),"7 their understanding of state practice leads them
to conclude that the liberations of Czechoslovakia by the U.S.S.R., and
Panama by the United States, were events that "would be lawful" under the
new post-Charter paradigm."' Leaving aside questions regarding the political
elasticity and utility of this interpretation, and apart from underlying questions
regarding their rhetorical reference to a new value hierarchy, the authors do
not adequately explain how their paradigmatically new framework is different
from the unrestrained status quo ante that conditioned the legal behavior of
states between 1648-1907.
This same point characterizes the final element of the post-Charter
paradigm shift: The use of force to correct an injustice done at "a particular
time" in the past." 9 Again, setting aside the eyebrow-raising assertions that
the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and the 1973 Arab invasion of Israel
115. Roberts, supra note 10, at 186.
116. U. N. CHARTER art. 1, 2; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, art. 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, in XI U.N. RESOLUTIONS,
SERIES I GENERAL ASSEMBLY 165 (1967); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
reprinted in 21 LL.M. 59 (1982); United Nations Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, inXIII U.N. RESOLUTIONS, SERIES I GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1971); Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16; Western
Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12.
117. See AREND & BECK, supra note 93, at 188. For preferred, although admittedly
recommendary set of suggestions with regard to jus ad bellum, see id. at 195-202.
118. Id. at 186.
119. Id. at 186-87.
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would be legal "had [they] been done today," 1 ° how is this new paradigm
distinguishable from the post-Westphalian practice of states?12 1The authors
suggest that the only post-Charter constraint that survives the death of the
Charter's jus ad bellum system is "the use of force for pure territorial
aggrandizement."12 But this proscription is hardly post-Charter. And as
evidenced by the example they cite, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the
resolution of the dispute was effectively handled within the context of the
Charter. The authors note that Iraq did attempt to characterize its actions as
necessary due to the previous de jure annexation of its territory by colonial
cartographers. But because the international community rejected this
justification, according to the authors, state practice makes clear that in
instances involving "too much of a transparent 'pretext',"" a remedy for
injustice that is terribly self-aggrandizing, by an individual state, is illegal."2
Even if this questionable formulation of a legal standard is one express
basis precluding resort to force to correct injustice, the post-Charter selfdefense paradigm clearly must revert in other, more difficult and numerous
cases, to pre-Charter practice. And in reference to the establishment of just
cause, specifically, and jus ad bellum, generally, the pre-Charter
jurisprudential history is as rich and enlightening as it is removed from the
academic hunt for paradigmatic significance. Rediscovering the twentieth
century's important qualitative contribution-Hague Convention II read in
light of the Venezuelan Arbitrations-is helpful before inventing a twenty-first
century jus ad bellum paradigm.
IV. Jus AD BELLUM'S TWENTIETH CENTURY DIVERSION

Hague Convention II was not the only conventional modification of jus
ad bellum in the twentieth century. If it were, students of international law
and diplomacy would more likely focus on its contribution. Instead, attention
was diverted to a bolder venture to outlaw war dejure. This was attempted
in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. 5 Two subject-specific dimensions were
120. Id. at 187.
121. This practice granted states unfettered license to use force as an instrument of national
policy.
122. AREND & BECK, supra note 93, at 187.
123. Id. at 188.
124. See id. at 187-88.
125. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 4. Earlier aborted attempts to outlaw aggression
included the 1923 Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the 1924 Geneva Protocol. See also
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 290 (1926). For a discussion of
these initiatives, see generally VON GLAHN, supra note 2, at 518.
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added by the 1945 Charter governing the Nuremberg international military
tribunal," 2 and. the proscription against the threat or use of force now
comprises the cornerstone of the United Nations Charter. 7 Intentionally
excluded from any operative provision of the Charter is usage of the term
war .
This diversion is unfortunate and due in part to the writings of notable
publicists," who discounted the jurisprudential significance of arbitration by
fixing on its ad hoc nature. According to this viewpoint, arbitration is an
imperfect means of explicating international legal rules. At best, arbitration
is indicative, and not dispositive, of these rules.
But this focus on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its aftermath has had
another, less contrived, yet more detrimental effect. Although sometimes
praised as a noble first step to free humanity from war, the Pact is more often
maligned as a colossal failure heaped on a stillborn, utopian idea. The
reputation of international law has not completely recovered from this attack,
which dredges up reminiscences of the familiar proverb, 'beware of your
wildest dream, for one day it may come true.' In the twentieth century, the
dream of outlawing war did not come true, but the dream certainly became
law.
The debate over the relevance of the Pact is well-rehearsed. But because
the Pact contained no mechanism for outlawing war except by recourse to
war itself, a procedural omission not entirely corrected by the peaceful
settlement and enforcement provisions of the Charter, realists have gained the
upper hand. And their critique of the Pact's futility has cast a long twentieth
century shadow over the relevance, or irrelevance, of jus ad bellwn.
This indictment has had an eviscerating effect on the integrity of
international law, generally, and jus ad bellum, specifically. Enthusiasts for
the proposition that aggression now violates a norm ofjus cogens 2 9 have yet
to account convincingly for the relevance of their claim, given the millions
of deaths from more than 100 wars that have resulted since the Charter
proscription came into effect. 30 The proscription against violating norms that
126. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544.
127. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
128. C. WnIFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 335 (1964);
STONE, supra note 34, at 74.
129. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. Jus cogent is a peremptory norm from which no derogation is allowed.
130. See MARx W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 167-69 (2d ed.
1993) (showing the divergence of public and private law in the area of international law has
led to the questioning of whether "international law was only a form of 'positive morality'
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are jus cogens did not take conventional form until 1969,131 but both the
relevant and tempering effect of its expression in treaty form remain in
dispute. And if the modem Charter regime governingJus ad bellwn, with its

article 2(4) buttress of theoretical completeness, cannot moderate with
reasonable certainty the Clausewitzian instincts of states, 3 2 then the
conclusion that jus ad bellum is largely obsolete133 unfortunately must mean
that humanity has not found an efficacious replacement for the classical
doctrine.
V.

Jus AD BELLUM'S LINK TO THE PAST

A. The League of Nation's Qualitative Contribution to Jus ad Bellum
The structure of the League of Nation's Covenant essentially mimicked
the procedural impediments idea established by the Hague Convention II. To
be sure, the League's mandate was broader and more highly refined, but its
qualitative contribution to jus ad bellum was mostly illusory. The League
Covenant did, however, restrict in three ways the right of members to resort
to war. First, the Covenant imposed a three month cooling off period after
issuance of a Council report, arbitral award, or judicial decision. 134 This idea
was not novel; it dated from a series of treaties, the so-called Bryan treaties,
concluded after 1912 by the United States and other countries. 1 35 Even
earlier, Hague Convention II had implied a temporal element by requiring
disputants to seek, at a minimum, a peaceful settlement before resorting to
force.
Second, the Covenant precluded recourse to war before the dispute had
been submitted to the League Council, arbitration, or adjudication for
settlement. 3 ' According to Professor Brownlie, the "distinction between
legal and illegal wars based upon the formal criterion of compliance or noncompliance with obligations to use procedures for pacific settlement of

and not really law at all.) [footnote omitted].
131. See id.
132. See CARL vON CLAUsEwrrz, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. and
tras., 1984) (arguing that war is a continuation of politics by other neans); see also A.
McNair & A.D. Watts, THE LEGAL EFFECrS OF WAR 18 (1966).
133. ING=D D. DE Lupis, THE LAw OF WAR 127 (1987).
134. LEAGuE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 12, para 1.
135. Treaties for the Advancement of Peace, in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 861 (supp. 1939);
STONE, supra note 34, at 167; BROwNLIE, supra note 2, at 23.
136. LFAGUE OF NATIONS COvENANT arts. 12, 13.
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disputes" introduced "a new concept to international law." 1 37 Actually, the
idea of making war contingent on the effective exhaustion of procedural
means of settlement had been established earlier by Hague Convention II.
The procedures in Hague Convention II were not spelled out as Articles 12,
13, and 15 of the League's Covenant, but reference was specifically made to
seeking arbitral settlement, as well as to the procedures laid down in the
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlements of Disputes.'
And if Hague
Convention II more properly marks the introduction of this idea to
conventional international law, then it merely replicated an idea espoused by
the important eighteenth century German publicist, Christian Wolff (16791754). 139
As a third restraint, the Covenant forbade war against a party to a
dispute that had accepted and implemented a unanimous Council report, or
other award or decision 1 -essentially the same negative proscription, minus
the problematic requirement of unanimity,"" implied by the Hague
Convention II.
Perhaps the most interesting contribution of the League Covenant to the
idea of jus ad bellum was contained in article 11, read in conjunction with
article 15. War was no longer purely a matter of national concern. "Any
circumstance... which threatened to disturb international peace"1 42 or "any
dispute likely to lead to a rupture" 4 in interstate relations had the potential
of becoming an object of League concern. Accordingly, such disputes had
to be submitted to one of three dispute resolution agencies. 1" The League
Covenant, in essence, asserted on behalf of its membership a subject matter
jurisdiction over all potential causes of interstate conflict. This enlarged
jurisdiction was the most important historical contribution of the Covenant.

137. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 57.
138. THE HAGUE CoNvENTIoNs AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 and 1907, 41 (James B.
Scott ed. 1915) [hereinafter ScorT, THE HAGUE CONVENTION].
139. See

CHISTIAN WOLFF, U Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM

290-93, 367 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1764).
140. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 13, para. 4, art. 15, para. 6.
141. Id. art. 5, para. 1. "Except where otherwise expressly provided ....
decisions at
any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members
of the League represented at the meeting." Id. For a discussion of the way in which the
League circumvented the "crippling absurdity" of art. 5, see STONE, supra note 34, at 212-

13.
142. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11, para. 2.

143. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
144. Id. art. 12, para. 1, art. 15, para. 1.
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But even here, care should be exercised in assessing the qualitative sense
in which the Covenant broke new ground. The customary and conventional
laws of neutrality had already made war an object of international concern.
But neutrality internationalized war with respect to its effect (lus in bello),
and then only in regard to the rights and duties of third parties vis-a-vis
belligerents. If internationalizing the notion of war was not novel, then the
Covenant's interpretation of the notion was, at least from the postWestphalian perspective. The Covenant internationalized jus ad belium.
In doing so, the Covenant suggested a supranational level of association
among states that made war's prospect the subject of its jurisdiction before
the event itself. This level of association implied a link between jus ad
bellum's pre-modern scholastic origins and twentieth century international
relations. And if this level of interstate association fell below the lofty
republican ideal expressed by Wolff and his eighteenth century idea of civitas
maxima 1 4 s it nevertheless set an over-inclusive standard of universality, from
which twentieth century international law has yet to depart, but can only
desultoriously approximate.
B. ComparingPre-Modern and Modem Formulationsof Jus ad Bellum
1. Scholastic Imprimatur
The link betweenjus ad bellum's pre-modern formulation and its modern
incarnation is not very well understood, nor is it considered particularly
relevant. The pre-modern period (pre-1648) is identified with the writings of
the scholastics. As theologians, they were heavily influenced by natural law
thinking and were predominantly concerned about the justness of war.'"
Although this approach did allow recourse to war, this recourse was
circumscribed by moral considerations. In this sense, the scholastic ,otion
of jus ad bellum operated from the proposition that absent just cause, war
could be considered malum in se (a wrong in itself). The post-Westphalian
system, however, is generally characterized by a more dispassionate,
positivist approach to war, an approach that originally hinged on

145.

See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, I JUS GENrriM METHODO ScIENTIFIcA PERTRAcrATUM

4

(proposing the existence of a "supreme state" or civitas maxima). For the translation of this
METHOPO SCIEnIFICA PERTRACTATUM 13 (Joseph H. Drake
section, see U Jus GENTIm
trans., 1934). See generally PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN
oiP R voi.munows, 1T776-1,14, 1.-17 (1.993); see
WORLD, '1T L'w OF Nxroms ui
aso Nicholas Onuf, CaWtas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism, 88 AM.
J. INT' L. 280 (1994).
146. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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considerations of legality rather than justness.1 47 The legality of war, in this
modem sense, depended on procedural, institutional, and consensual factors,
not on appeals to rationality or metaphysics. War, in the modem sense, took
on the characteristic of malum prohibitwn (a thing that is wrong because it is
prohibited).
The division of jus ad bellum into pre-modern and modem formulations
is simplistic. This division suggests that its attending natural law/scholastic
(malum in se) and positivist law (malwn prohibitwn) constructions are
mutually exclusive and temporally separated. 1'8
This suggestion is
misleading. For more than 200 years after the founding of the modem state
system, there was little, if any, discussion of establishing legal impediments
to a state's right of resort to war. But states began to reconsider the
unrestricted right of recourse beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.
Although this reconsideration first swayed heavily in the direction of positivist
formulations, a surprising resurgence of natural law thinking followed; this
resurgence was made more surprising by the powerful legacy of important
nineteenth century positivists who taught of the separation of law from
morality.149 The distinction between just and legal causes of war became
increasingly artificial, and by the time of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the fusion
of jus ad bellum's parallel formulations had become tightly interwoven.",
War was not only procedurally (although imperfectly) constrained, it was
again morally wrong. As an undifferentiated concept,"' jus ad bellum's
integrity had been reestablished after almost 300 years. The rise of natural
law, whether emblematic of renaissance or recrudescence, was truly
remarkable, and it was made more so by the avenue through which it gained
expression, jus in bello.
2. Transmogrification of Jus ad Bellum
This process of fusing the separated procedural and substantive elements
of jus ad bellum began to develop with the 1856 Congress of Paris, which
modestly sought to introduce fixed principles regarding the maritime law of
war. 15 The fusion was fortified during the American Civil War, with the

147. See SCHwARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 60, at 158.
148. See Gardam, supra note 113, at 392-93.
149. See generally id.
150. See generally Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 4.
151. See Gardam, supra note 113, at 395.
152. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, reprinted in 1 AM. J.
IWT'L L. (OFF. Doc. Supp.) 89 (1907).
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Union's adoption of Lieber's 1863 Code for Armies in the Field, which
foreshadowed the modem era of humanitarian law."' Alleviating the
calamities of war and conciliating its recourse with laws of humanity would
find textual expression in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which
restricted the wartime use of certain explosive projectiles."' Humanitarian
law would quickly find institutional support with the establishment of the
International Red Cross in 1870,55 and achieve broader exposure in the form

of the Martens Clause of the 1899 Hague Regulations and 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 1M
Adding critical mass to the burgeoning international law of war were the
important contributions of the two Hague Conferences. Some of these
contributions were as broad and ambitious as the tides of the conventions
suggest, including the conventions respecting, concerning, or relating to the
Laws and Customs of War, 5 7 the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and

153. U.S. Adjutant General's Office, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863. See L.C.
GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw Op WAR 97-99

(1985).

154. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 grammes Weight, reprinted in HIGINs, THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES, supra note 23, at 5-7 (1909).
155. Note also The 1864 and 1906 Geneva Conventions for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Soldiers Wounded in Armies in the Field, and the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, reprintedin id. at 8-12, 18-35.
156. The operative phrase of the Martens Clause that appears in the Preamble to 1907
Hague Convention IV, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, declares:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war have been issued, the high
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience.
SCOTT, THE HAGUE CoNvEtcrIoNS, supra note 138, at 100.
A strong case can be made that the Martens Clause establishes a norm ofjus cogens.
The denunciation clauses contained in each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (art. 63 of
Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field; art. 62 of Convention U for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; art. 142 of Convention 1I Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and art. 158 of Convention IV Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the texts of which are reprintedin, DOCUMENTS, supra
note 3, at 193-337) "in no way impair[s] the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall
remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the Martens Clause." Id. The clause was also applied,
in extensio, to the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (art. 1), and Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflict (preamble). Id.
157. 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18
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Persons in Case of War on Land, the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships, 160 and Naval
in Naval War,
1
Other treaties, of equal importance, dealt with issueBombardment."
specific subjects, such as the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines," Asphyxiating Gases," and Expanding [Dum-dum] Bullets. 1 "
Regardless of the scope, much of the international law on the use of force in
the twentieth century further explicates the permissible and impermissible
conduct of war, which is predicated on the breakdown of the Charter
proscription against the threat or use of force. Prominent examples of this
emphasis on jus in bello include the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol," the four
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols, 1 " the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention, 67 and numerous arms control treaties negotiated since
World War II.
The rise of these treaties designed to mitigate the effects of war was
accompanied by heightened confidence in the international legal procedures
and mechanisms that could perhaps forestall or even preempt the outbreak of
war. Third party dispute settlement was seen as an effective means through
which war could be preempted. By the turn of the century, this idea was
clearly prevalent in international legal circles. Dispute settlement was most

October 1907, reprintedin ScoTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS, supra note 138, at 100-32.
158. Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, 18 October 1907, reprinted in id. at 133-40 (1918).
159. 1907 Hague Convention XII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
in Naval War, 18 October 1907, reprintedin id. at 209-19.
160. 1907 Hague Convention VI Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the
Outbreak of Hostilities, 18 October 1907, reprintedin id. at 141-45.
161. 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of
War, 18 October 1907, reprintedin id. at 157-62.
162. 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, 18 October 1907, reprinted in id. at 151-56.
163. 1899 Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 29 July 1899, reprinted
in id. at 225-26.
164. 1899 Hague Declaration 3 Concerning Expanding Bullets, 29 July 1899, reprinted
in id. at 227-28.
165. 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925,
reprintedin LAws OF WAR, supra note 3, at 137.
166. See supra text accompanying note 156.
167. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, 10 April 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163.

1994]

JUS AD BELLUM

certainly supported by what important authorities acclaimed as the greatest
achievement of the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, the Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.'" In Chapter II of this
convention, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established.'" Following
this initiative, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador
established the Central American Court of Justice in 1907, the first truly
constituted international court.7 ° Spurred by the success of important
bilateral arbitrations, proposals were made to also establish a Court of
Arbitral Justice,1 71 an International Criminal Court," an International Prize
Court, 175
" International Commissions of Inquiry,174 and an International Equity
Court.
This was the climate that established the attitudinal foundation for the
reintroduction of jus ad bellwn at the beginning of the twentieth century.
And as it came through the avenue of jus in bello, the approach to jus ad
bellum was decidedly piecemeal, at least, until the time of the inter-war
period. This was the appropriately cautious means of initiating proscriptions
against the use of force that would quickly give way to the more expansive
and vitiating interpretations of President Woodrow Wilson's vision. His
vision of a "disentangling alliance" of nations, "unit[ing] the peoples of the
world," formed on a "basis of common right and justice," and geared toward
liberty and freedom, elevated ideals over self interest.176 Notwithstanding the
U.S. Senate's rejection of President Wilson's plan to include the United States
in "a general association of nations," 1" the ethos of Wilsonianism 78 took
168. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 18 October 1907,
reprinted in SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONvENTIONS, supra note 138, at 41-88.
169. See id. at 57-63.
170. See The Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice,
reprinted in Malloy, supra note 54, at 239.
171. See JAMEfs SCOTr, 1 THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, 423
(1972); REPORTS, supra note 31, at 226-91.
172. See MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

1920-1942, 85-89 (1972).
173. See The Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court,
October 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 174-202 (Supp. 1908).
174. See HUDSON, supra note 172, at 37-41.
175. See generally GEORG SCHwARZENBERGER & WILLIAM LADD: AN EXAMINATION OF
TRIBUNAL (1935); WOLFGANO
FRiEDMANN, THE CONTRmUTiON oF ENGLISH EQUITY TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL
EQUrTY T, muaNAL (1935).
176. See A Memorial Day Address, May 30, 1916, in 37 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW
AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY

WILSON 126 (1981).
177. President Wilson's Fourteen Points, supra note 15, at 839-40.
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hold during the interwar period, along with its concomitant cosmopolitan
promise of world peace. The initial attempt was well conceived, if only
briefly sustained. When regulating behavior affecting the national interests
of states, prudence and efficacy suggest the construction of tightly
circumscribed, specially constituted dispute settlement processes. The
procedural focus and limited subject matter jurisdiction of Hague Convention
II, which emanated from the issue-specific purpose of the Venezuelan
Arbitrations, met these requirements.
The rise of arbitration and proposals for third party settlement facilitated
the reconciliation of the twin concepts of jus ad bellwu and jus in bello.
These concepts were de-linked originally in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. Many scholars, following the lead of Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht,179 point to Hugo Grotius and his publication of The Laws of War
and Peace, in 1625, as the seminal event in the rise of secular international
legal thinking, which eventually led to a 300 year transmogrification in the
idea of legally regulating war. In the seventeenth century, jus in bello (the
law regarding the conduct of war) began to eclipse jus ad bellum (the law
regarding the initiation of war). And it was not until the twentieth century,
specifically the Venezuelan Arbitrations, that legal attention again focused on
the idea of regulating the right of states to resort to war. But during the
interim, and mostly during the second half of the nineteenth century,
international law changed markedly.
Positivism, as the primary
methodological bent to the field, facilitated a belief that took hold and
promoted the efficacy of third party dispute settlement. Procedures and
institutions for the peaceful resolution of disputes began to develop, and
important conventions regulating the conduct and mitigating the effects of war
were concluded. But the horrors of World War I, which introduced weapons
such as the machine gun, the tank, and the submarine, and qualitatively
blurred the spatial landscape of war with aerial warfare and weapons of mass
destruction (gas), fomented initiatives for a more efficacious system of
control. It was from within this climate that a natural law solution again
asserted itself.

178. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
179. See generally Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23
Bsrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1946).
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C. Foregoing Forcefor Debt Recovery:
Jus ad Bellum's Venezuelan Legacy
At this century's end, the idea of precluding recourse to recover
contractual debts seems relatively insignificant given the crisis of crises that
litter the academic panorama. However, the idea of precluding recourse is
far more established today than it was at the advent of the century, when such
interventions were more commonplace. This attitudinal change need not be
asserted categorically; nor does it matter that this attitudinal change was not
immediately received as a controlling principle of state behavior. That this
norm is firmly established today is enough.
Evidence of this opinio juris" comes from a variety of sources. The
International Claims Tribunal established at the Hague in the wake of
ruptured relations between the United States and Iran stands as a major
example."' 1 But the current problem of international debt, which first took
on crisis proportions when Mexico announced in August 1982 that it could
no longer meet its service payments, 82 supports this proposition. By the time
of the Mexican announcement, total Latin American debt had reached an
estimated $295 billion,'" with the principal Latin American debtors expected
to devote thirty-five to forty percent of export revenue to interest payments. 14
By 1985, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico owed approximately $260 billion,
Argentina and Venezuela
out of a total regional debt of $400 billion.,
"deliberately" went into arrears "rather than submit to harsh austerity

programs, "186 an action implied by a 1984 joint statement issued by four Latin
American presidents that warned against the ability to match payment
schedules indefnitely.187 In addition, Brazil evidenced signs of debt fatigue

precipitated a speedily arranged moratorium on its debt
in 1987, which
188
repayments.

180.
181.
182.
and the

See supra text accompanying note 58.
See 1 Iran-U.S.C.T.R.
See Albert Fishlow, Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets During the 19th Century
Interwar Period, 39 INT'L ORG. 357, 383 (1985).

183. Benjamin J. Cohen, International Debt and Linkage Strategies: Some Foreign-Policy

Implications for the United States, 39 INT'L ORG. 699, 714 (1985).
184. Id.
185. See R. GILPIN, THE PoLrrICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 321
(1987).
186. Cohen, supra note 183, at 719.

187. Id.
188. See E.J. OLIVERI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
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The response of creditor-states to the chronic nature of international debt,
from the Baker and Brady Plans to the Toronto Summit and the idea of total
debt forgiveness,189 indicates that force is not a viable means of recovering
loans. Certainly poor investment strategies and overextended lending
practices of the developed world's private banking industries made the
problem as much an issue of creditors' domestic politics, as it did an issue of
foreign policy. If the issue of fault is relevant, then it is complicated by other
unforeseen events including the collapse of oil prices in the wake of the IranIraq war of attrition, high U.S. interest rates throughout the first half of the
1980s (precipitating destabilizing capital outflows from Latin America), and
the devastating earthquake in Mexico in 1985, which caused damage
estimated in the tens of billions of dollars. 190
In addition to these more publicized events, important private or quasipublic instrumentalities have arisen for the specific purpose of addressing
grievances regarding international nationalizations and foreign wealth
deprivations. Chief among these instrumentalities are the World Bank's
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 91 the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), 11 the Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law Arbitration (UNCITRAL), 19 and the Commercial
Arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).'" To this
list, one could also add various bilateral investment treaties,' 95 and the many
publicly financed insurance schemes established by developed countries to
provide insurance for national firms doing business in politically risky
countries. 19

FiNANCE 149-50 (1992).
189. A. Goazolo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin
American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66 (1991); see also MACLEAN's, June 20,

1988, at 20, 49.
190. See OLMvM, supra note 188, at 107.

191. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.

192. See Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 9 (1986).

193. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
1976 VII UNCJTRAL Yearbook (Part 1) 22 U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
194. Hans Smit, The New International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, 2 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 1 (1992).
195. See generally KENNETH I. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATMS:
POLICY AND PRACrICa (1992).
196. See Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the
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However, none of these organizations or arguments address the
fundamental issue of justice in international economic relations. Nor from the

perspective of developing countries is it clear that the proscription against the
use of force to recover contractual debts necessarily frees their domestic

political economies from foreign entanglement. Loan conditionality, debt
servicing, internationally mandated austerity programs, foreign aid
restrictions, GATT requirements, protectionist policies in developed
countries, and weak or inconvertible currencies, can be as invidious and
destablizing as any overt or implied threat of force by a foreign power. But
if it is true that democracies do not war against each other, and capitalist
economies are only slightly less likely to do the same,"' then these
considerations might contribute to an understanding of how the Jus ad bellum
regime has been changed profoundly by the practice of states. For the
recovery of contractual debts, the costs of resorting to forceful measures of
self-help may be more destructive of long term interests than peaceful
accommodation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Almost 100 years ago, the umpire in the Aroa Mines case, one of the
many cases comprising the Venezuelan Arbitrations, wrote as a solution to
a particular claim for remuneration, that "the end is justice." 98 With regard
to the establishment of a truly comprehensive international jus ad bellwn
regime, the end remains the same, although it will be left to "the better
angels of our nature" to secure.'" This consideration brings into question the
proper choice of means. While enthusiasts continue to seek prospective and
paradigmatic solutions that are predicated on unestablished or premature
claims of a new world order, when they are not reinventing what is already
known, the better idea is to rediscover and then add incrementally to the
soundjus ad bellum foundation established by the Venezuelan Arbitrations.
Specialized and circumscribedfora, whether institutional or ad hoc, offering
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procedurally secure means of redress, have the best potential of expanding the
modernjus ad bellum regime. If beginnings are difficult and inroads modest
into this most closely guarded sphere of sovereign authority, then it is
reassuring and instructive to realize the important inroads that already have
been made.

